Nehru’s miscalculation: How India lost Tibet’s strategic advantage

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2020
Jawaharlal Nehru
Jawaharlal Nehru

While Nehru’s vision of peaceful diplomacy was admirable, it failed to account for the ‘realpolitik’ of international relations.

When Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister, chose to recognize China’s sovereignty over Tibet in the 1950s, he likely believed he was fostering goodwill with Beijing. Instead, his decision proved to be a “strategic blunder” that continues to haunt India’s security and foreign policy to this day. By failing to grasp Tibet’s geopolitical significance, Nehru inadvertently weakened India’s position in the Himalayas, allowing China to consolidate control over a region that could have served as a crucial buffer.

Historically, Tibet functioned as a “natural barrier” between India and China, insulating the Indian subcontinent from direct Chinese influence. Its high-altitude terrain made military incursions difficult, and its distinct cultural and political identity ensured that it remained separate from Beijing’s control for centuries. However, when China invaded Tibet in 1950, Nehru’s government chose “diplomatic appeasement” over confrontation, failing to recognize the long-term consequences of allowing China to dominate the region.
Instead of pushing back against China’s expansionism, Nehru pursued a policy of “non-alignment and peaceful coexistence”, famously encapsulated in the “Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai” (India-China Brotherhood) slogan. This approach ignored the reality that China was rapidly militarizing Tibet, constructing infrastructure that would later facilitate its “aggressive border policies” against India.
The most immediate fallout of Nehru’s Tibet policy was the “1962 Sino-Indian War”, in which China decisively defeated India and seized control of Aksai Chin, a strategically vital region in Ladakh. India’s failure to anticipate China’s territorial ambitions left it vulnerable, and the loss of Tibet as a buffer zone meant that Chinese troops could now operate directly along India’s borders.

Even today, India faces “persistent border tensions” with China, particularly in Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh. The infrastructure China has built in Tibet—highways, military bases, and airfields—has given it a logistical advantage in any potential conflict. Meanwhile, Tibet itself has become “one of the most heavily surveilled and militarized regions in the world”, with its people subjected to strict control and suppression.
Nehru’s miscalculation serves as a “cautionary tale” for Indian policymakers. While his vision of peaceful diplomacy was admirable, it failed to account for the “realpolitik” of international relations. China’s control over Tibet has not only reshaped the Himalayan geopolitical landscape but has also ensured that India remains locked in a “perpetual struggle” to defend its borders.
As India navigates its future relations with China, it must recognize the “strategic errors of the past” and ensure that it does not repeat them. Tibet’s fate may be sealed, but its lessons remain invaluable.

* Nephew of the Dalai Lama, Khedroob Thondup is a geopolitical analyst.