India and Israel went beyond the typical crisis management by redefining deterrence not as frozen, but dynamic and multi-dimensional.
In a short span of time, India and Israel began decisive military campaigns—India’s Operation Sindoor and Israel’s Operation Rising Lion—that directly challenged the long-standing nuclear deterrence posturing of Pakistan and Iran. These ambitious moves herald a sea change in states’ power to answer nuclear-armed or aspiring nuclear enemies with viable conventional responses under the nuclear overhang, if states have strategic motivations, technological advantage, and discriminate restraint.
India’s Operation Sindoor on 7 May 2025, was a response to the Pahalgam terror attack conducted by Pakistan-based terrorists, with a special focus on attacking Hindu tourists. Unlike earlier crises—in which India’s responses were either covert or symbolically constrained—Sindoor enunciated a new doctrine of escalatory control using calibrated punishment. Long-range precision weapons such as Rafales with SCALP missiles and Israeli SPICE-guided bombs were used to target multiple bases and supporting military infrastructure of terrorists across the Line of Control. Remarkably, these strikes were levelled again and again on consecutive nights, signalling a change of doctrine from deterrence-by-denial to deterrence-by-punishment. The greatest departure, however, was India’s effort to act regardless of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Conventionally, the Pakistani military has relied on its nuclear capability to provide cover to proxy terrorism. With strikes directly at Pakistani military installations that were used to sponsor terrorism—and not going to a general war—India called this bluff. Strikes were precise and carefully controlled: no attacks on Pakistani cities, on nuclear installations, on strategic hubs. Such surgical strikes prevented escalation and sent a very serious military and political message.
Meanwhile, Israel’s Operation Rising Lion, begun on 13 June 2025, struck at the very heart of the Iranian nuclear installation and military high command. In response to a lost diplomatic opportunity and a scathing IAEA report, Israel conducted a surprise aerial and cyber-attack that reportedly eliminated senior IRGC leadership, disabled air defences, and destroyed command-and-control centres—a testament to Israel’s distinctive combination of technology and intelligence, the deployment of F-35I stealth aircraft, Mossad-prepositioned loitering ordinance, and cyber-attacks all worked together to overwhelm Iranian defences. For Israel, the goal was not to retaliate, but to pre-empt. Tehran’s slow nuclearization and serial threats to Israel’s very survival indicated a resolute implementation of the Begin Doctrine—decades-long habit of not allowing threats to existence reach their full maturity. The success of Rising Lion to create operational dislocation—temporarily disabling Iranian defensive and command machinery—vouched for years-long technical preparations and political will.
Both exercises demonstrated strategic reimagination. India and Israel went beyond the typical crisis management by redefining deterrence not as frozen, but dynamic and multi-dimensional. The political leaderships—Narendra Modi and Benjamin Netanyahu—were singularly instrumental to this dramatic change, with the military planners developing flexible, high-precision options short of all-out war. Their decisiveness replaced new postures of action against old ones of “strategic patience” and reactive diplomacy with postures that imposed costs to adversaries, but gave leeway to de-escalate. Timing was also key. India attacked within 14 days of the Pahalgam attack, before international attention could diversify or Pakistani terrorists spread. Israel’s offensive was initiated at the precise moment that diplomatic forays was unsuccessful, surprising Iran. In both cases, using surprise and initiative ensured that the attacks created non-reversible facts on the ground before the enemy had a chance to employ its strategic weapons. Rapidity also constricted decision cycles and disrupted enemy escalation plans.
Technological and qualitative military superiority acted as enablers. Stand-off weapons, Rafales, and drone power allowed India to penetrate deep with low risk of mass mobilization. The escalation dominance was left to Israel’s fifth-generation F-35s, most recent EW (electronic warfare) technology, and human intelligence. These campaigns point to a noteworthy fact: nuclear shadow deterrence at the conventional level is possible only with stand-alone spends on military modernization, real-time ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) capabilities, and cyberspace power. Still, both sides also acted with self-restraint. India indicated that it was not attacking civilian centres nor Pakistan’s core targets of strategic importance. Israel, with its enormous scale of offensive, was bent on declaring that it was targeting Iran’s regime and nuclear program, not the Iranian nation. Restraint preserved legitimacy, gave both sides the leeway to exit, and ensured international parties, primarily the United States, that both operations were limited in aim and proportionate in execution.
The deterrence consequences reach into the future. Pakistan, accustomed to depending on its nuclear status to cloak jihadist proxies, now has a precedent of direct deterrence by India. Iran, that viewed nuclear ambiguity as a strategic bonus, discovered that uncertainty invites pre-emptive strike. These are not lessons that are unlearned. North Korea, for example, may now have more reason to fear transmitting nuclear thresholds with a lack of credible assurance of deterrence.
At the same time, such operations are indicative of the limits of imitation. States that have geopolitical autonomy and qualitative superiority only can mount such risky manoeuvres with risks of uncontrollable escalation. Others, the cases offer blueprints—in equal measure, cautionary tales. Traditional strikes against nuclear threats have to be founded on proper intelligence, high-end militaries, and a political culture that is willing to take risk, not recklessness.
India and Israel have thus inscribed a new page in deterrence doctrine. Whereby nuclear weapons previously froze classic decision-making, a carefully calibrated combination of preparedness, restraint, and resolve has shown that deterrence is not only challenged, but also turned. The challenge now is to ensure that this precedent does not justify preventive or punitive action, but deters subsequent adventurism on the part of actors who have nuclear cover. As the strategic dust settles, the world is left to speculate whether such events are unique incidents or a start to a new deterrence paradigm. In a nuclearized world, the art of just operating just short of the threshold while re-shaping strategic behaviour is the last challenge to statecraft. India and Israel have so far succeeded that challenge—at least thus far—by a display of lion-hearted courage beneath the shadow of the bomb.
* Manish Dabhade is an Associate Professor, School of International Studies, JNU Founder of The Indian Futures, an independent think tank in New Delhi.
